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ABSTRACT
Through what mediums is it possible to spread status? Prior research shows that
status can be inferred from reward states, status and expectations can spread from one
valued characteristic to another, and that differences in the status value of an object
possessed by an individual can lead to differences in power during exchange interactions.
However, it is not known if possession of these objects actually results in increased status
and expectations for an individual possessing the status valued object. Building on Status
Value Theory, Status Construction Theory, Reward Expectations Theory, and the Status
Value Theory of Power, I construct a theoretical extension to Status Value Theory that
proposes that objects are able to temporarily transfer status via possession.
In this thesis I lay out the theoretical extension, referred to as the Possession of
Status Value Theory, and provide results from an experiment done on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk platform. Results provide partial support for the theory, showing that
the status value of objects possess by high status others is acknowledge by future
recipients of a status valued object. However, status value transfers only when the
participant possesses the high status valued object, and expectations transfer only when
their partner is possesses the high status valued object. In addition, low status valued
objects seem to have a floor effect for how little status value they contain and how low
the expectations individuals have for themselves and others can fall because of
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possession. The thesis concludes with a discussion of these findings, proposing 3 possible
explanations for the results, and future directions for this research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Can possession of an object lead to greater or lesser status for an individual?
Status, often thought of as prestige or honor, is a primary line of categorization for human
interaction. Humans use it to select leaders (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway and Berger
1986), distribute resources (Berger et al. 19851), and influence each other (Berger et al.
1977). In fact, status is even considered when forming reciprocal friendships (Frank
1985; Ball and Newman 2013) and selecting romantic partners (McPherson et al. 2001).
Previous research has indicated that the value of objects an individual possesses is also
influenced by their status (Thye 2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). However, in this study I
am interested in the reverse, does possession of an object lead to greater or lesser status
for an individual?
We know that humans use objects in everyday life to expressive themselves.
Objects can be used as tokens for an individual to demonstrate something not physically
observable, be that status (Fisek et al. 2005), characteristics or attributes not externally
seen (Fisek et al. 2005), or illustrations of our identity, personality, or character (Sliver
1996). However, it is still unclear if status is actually gained from possession of these
objects. Assuming that individuals do gain status from possession, it is unknown if
possession of a status valued object would behave similarly to possession of a
characteristic. In addition, we know little about how status value, both positive and
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negative, transfers from individuals to objects, or from interaction to interaction, and over
long periods of time.
The ability for objects to confer status or other attributions to an individual is not
a new line of theory or inquiry. Thorstein Veblen discusses this phenomenon at the turn
of the 20th century, presenting a theory claiming that Americans chase spending trends of
upper class individuals in order to present themselves as higher in social class (Veblen
1899). Veblen’s illustration of this specifically focuses on Middle Class Americans and
their willingness to spend large amounts of money to imitate spending habits of higher
social classes, often purchasing clothing, taking vacations, and participating in leisure
activities that are common among upper class individuals. Veblen also proposes that,
over time, this actually causes upper class cultural trends to become more extreme or
change to different practices in order to further distinguish themselves from the middle
class.
More recently, Sociological Social Psychologists have become interested in
objects and the effects of their possession. They have found that that possession of higher
status characteristics in an exchange interaction increase the exchange value of objects
these individuals hold (Thye 2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). Although these studies
typically look at characteristics of an individual, such as age, sex, and education, the
resulting theories they use do lend important concepts and insights into if and how
objects are increasing an individual’s status.
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION
Does possession of a status valued object confer status to those that possess it?
And does the conferred status provide expectations for performance that are similar to
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those we could normally expect from possessing a status characteristic? Status, in these
research questions, is defined as perceived prestige or honor (Berger et al. 1977). A status
valued object refers to an object that has worth, prestige, or honor attached to it (Thye
2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). For example, Stradivarius Violins, Italian Violins crafted
by members of the Stradivarius family, are highly prized by collectors and musicians.
This common preference is derived from their association with the Stradivarius family
and their reputation for producing high quality string instruments, a as well as from
repetitive possession by high preforming violin players. However, although the
instruments are highly prized, there is no evidence that they are superior to modern
violins in sound quality, ease of use, or any other objective criterion (Belluck 2014).
Instead, theses violins seem to be prized because they have accumulated status value. The
possessor of such an instrument is viewed as having attained higher status purely by
virtue of possession. Indeed, possessing a Stradivarius instrument conveys status
somewhat independently of the means used to acquire it, as both purchasing an
instrument outright or being loaned such an instrument by its owner convey status to the
holder. Thus, the value of a Stradivarius instrument derives primarily from the impact it
has on one’s status, rather than from anything intrinsic to the instrument itself.
Often objects, such as the Stradivarius violin, take a substantial amount of
resources or effort to obtain. This amount of effort and resources used to obtain one is
typically considered a signal of their value to the individual and they are expected to be a
reflection of the individuals status and influence (Veblen 1899). And this does not only
extend to objects, as individuals will also spend large amounts of resources to be
associated with high status others or be a part of high status groups (Frank 1985). In
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addition, these objects may serve as a signal to others of some unobserved or not
immediately notable trait, a kind of ability, position of importance or legitimacy, or an
amount of power.
Signaling behaviors have also been studied in other contexts. Research in both
Biology and Economics have used these concepts under the label of Costly Signaling
Theory (Spence 1973), which proposes that individuals and groups use their resources or
characteristics to signal their power, competence, and willingness to cooperate. In order
to display such costly behavior signals, the resources available must already be abundant
for the waste to be sustainable. This abundance indicates already present power and
ability. Examples include work on resource exchange situations in which individuals gift
resources they hold to signal trustworthy behavior, hoping to get better exchange deals in
future interactions (Gintis et al. 2001; Fehr and Gächter 2002). There is also research that
similar traits are used by non-human species to find mates (Searcy and Nowicki 2005). In
effect, there is precedent for thinking of objects as mechanisms for signaling status or
ability to others, and this exists across many domains of inquiry.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
To understand the concept of status value and its operationalization, I will review
a selection of major theories from the Expectation States Research Program. In addition
to this, I will also review the concepts of status and power as they are presented in the
Status Value Theory of Power. The Expectation States Research Program is concerned
with how expectations are created for individuals involved in collective interactions and
how these expectations shape hierarchies of status and prestige. There are four theories
from the Expectation States Research Program that apply directly to this work. They are
Status Characteristics Theory, Reward Expectations Theory, Status Construction Theory,
and Status Value Theory.
Status Characteristics Theory (hereafter SCT) is a branch of the Expectation
States Research Program that is used to explain the formation of status hierarchies in
groups and the expectations that form around them (Berger et al. 1972; Berger et al.
1974; Berger et al. 19852). The theory proposes that performance expectations are
formed from differences in status between individuals (Berger et al. 1977). Performance
expectations themselves are beliefs about how an individual possessing certain
characteristics will perform. These expectations are shaped by an Observable Power and
Prestige Order (hereafter OPPO), a hierarchy that is ordered by individuals’ status
relevant to the rest of their group and reflects expectations for performance. The OPPOs
are typically noticed and enforced by specific behaviors, such as deference, difference in
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performance opportunities, differences in rewards for performance, and increased
likelihood of holding leadership positions.
OPPOs are formed from Status Characteristics, which are attributes that form
around differences in cognitions and evaluations (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 2015).
These characteristics possess status value, which confer status onto an individual that
possesses them, and can be one of two different types, diffuse and specific. Diffuse Status
Characteristics are attributes an individual possesses that are positively or negatively
evaluated; they are perceived as instrumental to a task, and carry performance
expectations that generalize to a larger social setting. Examples such as race, age, and
education would be considered diffuse characteristics. Specific Status Characteristics are
similar to diffuse, except their evaluations are not generalizable in a larger social setting.
Characteristics such as math, writing, and woodworking ability would be considered
specific characteristics. However, characteristics that an individual possesses are not the
only thing that contributes to the formation of expectations. Some characteristics are not
visible or salient in interactions but can be brought up and made salient through the use of
Status Cues, including styles of dress, speech, or behavior that are used to infer a Status
Characteristic (Fisek et al. 2005). Examples of this would be a college class ring as an
indicator of education or an expensive watch as an indicator of income.
Characteristics not only influence expectations and an individual’s position in a
hierarchy of their peers, they also have a strong influence on the distribution of rewards
to group members and how rewards are expected to be distributed in a wider social
context. Reward Expectations Theory deals specifically with this phenomenon, studying
how interactions between characteristics and expectations influence the distribution of
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goal objects. These can be positions, privileges, and resources or physical objects that can
be exchanged (Berger et al. 19851). Goal objects are typically distributed by referential
structures, which are socially legitimate sets of principles that designate how goal objects
should be distributed (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 2014), and are typically based on
salient characteristics, such as race and gender (Ridgeway and Berger 1986). The process
of reward allocation can also confirm status. This is done by an individual with no
information on another’s status characteristics or how those characteristics are
interoperated in a wider social context. Reward Expectations Theory proposes the people
infer the referential structure that caused that distribution of rewards from visible
attributes, such as status characteristics. They then infer the status and expectations
attached to characteristics from that structure (Cook 1975; Berger et al. 1977; Berger et
al. 2014). This is often referred to as the reverse process, and is vital as a mechanism for
theories that propose paths or discuss ways in which status characteristics are created.
There are two proposed methods by which status characteristics are created,
doubly dissimilar encounters and diffusion from existing characteristics, both of which
use some form of the reverse inference process described above. Status Construction
Theory utilizes the process of doubly dissimilar encounters, in which at least two
individuals interact on some task, while also possessing different levels of a nominal
characteristic and goal objects or resources (Ridgeway 1991, 2000; Ridgeway and
Erickson 2000; Webster and Hysom 1998). Over time these interactions form
expectations for levels of the nominal characteristic and are spread to others through
interaction with individuals that were in the original doubly dissimilar encounter, or
through explicit teaching of the expectations.
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Status Value Theory (or Diffusion of Status Value Theory) is a response to Status
Construction Theory and proposes that status and expectations can spread between an
existing status characteristic and a nominal characteristic if both are possessed by the
same individual (Berger and Fisek 2006). Similar to Status Construction Theory,
repetitive interactions cause status and expectations to be transferred from one
characteristic to another, creating value for those characteristics. Following this transfer,
the new status characteristic can then stand on its own and is used in future interactions to
imply status, expectations, and rewards (Berger and Fisek 2006). In addition to status
spreading to nominal characteristics, the theory goes a step further and proposes that
status and expectations can also spread to objects. Once the status value is of the object is
successfully established it can be legitimated from repetitive behavioral affirmation in the
general population (Ridgeway and Berger 1986, Zelditch and Floyd 1998). Numerous
studies and a computer simulation have shown that both types of interactions will foster
status beliefs (Ridgeway 1998; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000; Ridgeway and Balkwell
1997; Walker et al. 2011). Regardless of the mechanism, as the beliefs about the
characteristics spread into the larger population, they will tend to achieve consensus
acceptance. This is because those using them think of these beliefs as legitimate ways to
infer expectations, status, and rewards (Zelditch and Floyd 1998; Kalkhoff 2005;
Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2000).
In addition to differences in the status and expectations between levels of a status
characteristic, there may also be differences in exchange power. The Status Value Theory
of Power joins together ideas from the Expectation States literature, as well as theories on
power and exchange. It predicts that individuals in possession of higher valued status
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characteristics will also have an increase in the value of their exchangeable resources,
regardless of the actual monetary value of the resources. This in turn would give
individuals with greater status more power in exchange relationships, allowing them to be
more selective when picking exchange partners, and demanding more in exchange for
their resources (Thye 2000). Additional studies have found that this increase in exchange
power also provides greater influence outside of the exchange relationship (Thye, Willer,
and Markovsky 2006).
A series of experiments have confirmed these predictions, showing that higher
status individuals are able to extract more resources from lower status partners in
exchange for resources they possess (Thye 2000). In addition, a recent study manipulated
the number of salient characteristics differentiating individuals (one vs. multiple) and the
distinctness of resources (same colored objects vs. different colored objects). They found
that reducing the number of status characteristics distinguishing actors to a single
characteristic still supported the initial theory (Thye and Harrell 2016). In support of
status value’s connection to more abstract concepts, Harkness (2017) found that
differences in reward levels, the amount one is compensated for a task, behave similarly
to status characteristics and are used to infer expectations.
2.1 STATUS VALUE IN THE EXPECTATION STATES PROGRAM
Connecting all of these theories is the concept of status value. Status value is
present in the formation of status hierarchies (Berger et al. 1977), in the characteristics
found in doubly dissimilar encounters (Ridgeway 1991, 2000), and in the diffusion of
status from a valued status characteristic to a nominal characteristic (Berger and Fisek
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2006). All of these situations incorporate status value by either creating status value for a
characteristic, or from the inference made through referential structures.
SCT and Reward Expectations Theory interprets status value as the abstract worth
that society gives to an object or personal characteristics (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al.
2015; Berger et al. 19851). For a diffuse characteristic this is fairly straightforward; it is
interpreted as salient during all interactions and has a concrete value structure associated
with it to infer how an individual will perform at certain tasks. For a specific
characteristic this is different, as the relevance of the characteristic does not generalize
beyond a specific set of interactions (Berger et al. 1977). This also means that the status
value and expectations for such a characteristic would be restricted to the same set of
interactions. For example, individuals with high musical ability are not also assumed to
be highly intelligent.
Reward Expectations Theory applies these concepts a bit differently. For Reward
Expectations Theory status value is applied to reward allocation and valuation of goal
objects distributed after a task is completed. Those in possession of high states of a status
characteristic are expected to perform better at a task and contribute more. Because of
this they are adequately compensated for their expected performance, which is tied to the
status value of their characteristics. However, often goal objects are distributed before
performance expectations are known to observers or future individuals that will be in a
similar interaction. In these cases, instead of allocating goal objects by the expectations
that come from an individual’s characteristics, the reverse is done. Expectations are
inferred by the rewards an individual possesses with the assumption that they are
indicators of ability. In this reverse process, the rewards already allocated indicate the

10

status value of the characteristics an individual possesses (Berger et al. 1972; Berger et al.
1998). By using knowledge from an observed situation as a referential structure and the
individuals involved as referential actors, it is assumed that similar others will also have
the same allocation of resources, abilities, and expectations.
Status Construction Theory and Status Value Theory focus on the creation of
status value. Status Construction Theory does this via doubly dissimilar encounters
(Ridgeway 1991, 2000). Status Value Theory proposes that, in addition to doubly
dissimilar encounters, the existence of a status valued characteristic and nominal
characteristic by the same individual would be enough for status value to spread from one
characteristic to the other via association (Berger and Fisek 2006, 2013). In both of these
theories it is the presence of a difference in resources, or already valued characteristics
and the presence of a nominal characteristic, which creates and spreads status value. The
actual possession of a status valued object as the differing factor has not been
theoretically or experimentally explored.
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CHAPTER 3
POSSESSION OF STATUS VALUE THEORY
We know a great deal about status and characteristics or items associated with
status. Literature proposes and tests many theories on status’s creation, it spread, and its
effects on interactions (Webster and Walker 2017). However, in Veblen’s discussion of
the concept of Conspicuous Consumption, it is proposed that possession of a status
valued object brings an individual status, along with power and legitimacy in their social
position (Veblen 1899). We know that individuals will spend large amounts of money
and effort to possess objects they feel are associated with their status in society or the
status of higher social classes and that these behaviors also occur at the micro level
within group interactions. However, questions relating to gaining status, especially
temporarily, from possession of a status valued object have not been answered.
To answer these questions, I propose an extension to Status Value Theory that
focuses on object value, possession, and transfer. Based on previous work, it seems likely
that status valued objects can be used to distinguish individuals in terms of status and
expectations. In this instance object are used as a reference for expected status and
expectations, is similar to the reverse process outlined in Reward Expectations Theory.
And allows status and expectations to be attached to an object instead of an individual.
Formally, I propose that a status valued object acquires status in the initial
interaction which it is part of, and that the status value attached to the object can be
temporarily gifted to an individual possessing the object. When an individual is
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possessing a status valued object, is serves as a reference to a referential structure that
was created during an observed interaction. This would be expected to increase their
overall status regardless of existing status characteristics. The increase in overall status
would also increase their performance expectations that individual holds for themselves,
and others hold for them. However, once the object is no longer in their possession the
reference to the referential structure is also removed, resetting their status and
expectations to levels similar to before possession of the object.
This process of temporary possession could be continued with new individuals
possessing the object and being gifted status and associated expectations through
possession of the object. In addition to this, I propose that it is possible not only for high
status value, but also low status value to spread from an object to an individual. Similar to
the process described above, we would expect an individual with a low status valued
object to have their status decreased along with their expectations.
The proposed extension focuses on situations that involve at least two
interactions, complete turnover in actors participating in the interaction, and salience of
an object and its status value. Actors infer status value from observation of others,
treating them as referential actors (Berger et al. 1998). Beyond this state, the status value
of an object should be able to transfer status to new situations on its own, without the
need of a diffuse or specific characteristic as long as the status value and a reference to its
creation is salient. Markovsky, Berger, and Smith (1984) demonstrate that status
interventions persist across task situations and interactants, with a decay function over
time. I assume the same mechanisms would be true for this theory.
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These outcomes are expected to happen if the conditions under which an object
initially gains status value are known to those interacting with the object as possessors
and observers of an interaction. In other words, if objects are present in an interaction
which is not made public to other individuals, then the object cannot be expected to
spread status and expectations to others. We would also not expect the object to spread
status and expectations if it is not valued by observers of the initial interaction, as they
would have no reason to care about and keep track of the object. This could be because
the object is not unique enough to be noticed, or because its notoriety gets lost in multiple
other stimuli occurring in an interaction.
In addition to this there are several scope conditions for this theory. First, it is
expected that there are at least two distinct objects possessed by different individuals.
This is needed to make the comparison between situations as equal as possible, as lack of
an object by one actor would create a difference that is not the focus on the theoretical
mechanism. For example, an instance where one actor has an object and another does not,
could accidently indicate status or value related to an attribute of the individual instead of
the object. Although this does not mean that the objects can’t be the same thing, such as
two violins, they must be distinguishable. Second, actors are differentiated only by the
object that they possess. Third, actors in the initial interaction perform differently on a
task in a way that is salient and severe enough to create different expectations for future
performance. In other words, it is expected that one actor does quite well at a task
compared to another. A formal theory section with clear layouts of each proposition and
derivation, definitions, and a theory diagram is included in the appendix.
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3.1 HYPOTHESIS
To test the initial parts of this theory, specifically the ability of status value and
expectations to spread to an object and back to an individual, I propose the following
hypotheses.

H1: Observed differences in an interaction between two referential actors in which one
preforms better than the other will increase the status value of objects held by the high
preforming actor.
H2: Possession of a high status valued object will increase an actor’s status during a
collectively oriented task.
H3: Actors in possession of high status valued objects will have higher performance
expectations.

15

CHAPTER 4
METHODS
This study uses a 4-condition experimental design. The design results in two
conditions in which the status of the valued objects was equated, and two conditions in
which the status of the valued object was not equated. In these unequal conditions, one
assigns the participant the high status object, and the other assigns their partner with the
high status object. See table 4.1 for an illustration.
Table 4.1 Conditions
Actor object value
Other Object

Low Status

Value

Value
High Status
Value

Low Status Value

High Status Value

Condition 1

Condition 3

Condition 2

Condition 4

The high and low status valued objects used in this experiment are geometric
shapes and symbols obtained from a free online icon library (https://www.iconsdb.com/).
These shapes and symbols are referred to as avatars during the study and will henceforth
be referred to by the same term. The avatars were pretested as part of a set of 20 to select
the ones that were the most similar and most attractive to a sample population. The goal
was to select the avatars that had the highest attractiveness and were the most similar in
terms of their rating. It was expected that this would lead to avatars that are rated as
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similar in terms of attractiveness during typical interactions. To decide which were the
most similar, a short pilot study was conducted to norm the avatars, illustrating the
baseline attractiveness for each. In the end, four avatars were selected. These were the
aperture, sun, light, and eye avatars. The final avatars are shown in figure 4.1. The sun
and aperture avatars were selected as status valued objects. Additional information about
the norming study, including detailed methods and the results, are provided in the
appendix. In addition to the norming study, a study pilot using the same population was
carried out before putting the study online to make sure all aspects of the study
functioned as intendent.

Figure 4.1 Final Study Avatars
Before the study launched, changes were made to allow for counterbalancing of
avatars used as status valued objects. This meant that when some participants took the
study, the sun avatar was the high status valued object. When others participated, the
aperture was. This was done to ensure that the mechanism being tested was the actual
spread of status value instead of personal attachment to the avatars or preference for a
geometric shape or pattern.
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Significant differences are found between the video versions created for
counterbalancing. Individuals in the video version which the aperture avatar was using as
the high status avatar reported a higher mean on the Status Value scale when rating the
observed interaction, indicating that the aperture avatar was valued more than the sun
avatar by participants. However, when comparing between the low status avatars it is
found that this video version also has its low status avatar, in this case the sun avatars,
rated as higher compared to the other video version. Taking this into account, both
avatars are rated as having greater status value in this video version. The actual
differences between high and low status avatars in both video versions are insignificant,
leading to the conclusion that counterbalancing had no additional effects other than
isolating the mechanisms of interest.
The experiment was carried out using Qualtrics, a popular survey and vignette
experiment platform. Participants for the experiment were recruited using Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (hereafter mTurk), a worker recruitment website that is actively used
for both simple programing or transcription tasks and research1. A total of 192
participants are included in the study, 48 in each condition. The number of responses
collected was around 204. However, drops were made because some individuals failed
suspicion checks, and additional drops were made to equate cell sizes for conditions2. All

1

During data collection mTurk had a verification issue in which individuals were able to take studies using
the same IP address if they switched mTurk accounts, effectively getting around ballot box stuffing
measures put in place by Qualtrics. Although the issue has been patched, this did increase the drop rate for
this study. After the second wave of data collection the issue was noticed and if an IP address was found to
be the same as an earlier one then the participant was dropped from the dataset and they were not paid for
additional attempts to take the study. Instead they were sent a message manually through the mTurk
website that informed them that their IP address was already attached to a previous response to the study
and that they are only able to participate once.
2

Drops were made to equate all conditions to the condition with the fewest observations. This was
condition 4, which had 48 observations. To equate conditions: 5 observations were dropped from condition
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drops to equate condition sizes were done using a random number generator that
generated an ID number from those available in the overrepresented condition.
The experiment was divided into two parts. The first part introduced the avatars,
the task, and the scales used to rate performance. The avatars were introduced as a status
valued object via a video. This video was introduced as being from a previous interaction
between two individuals that had taken the study. It was noted that during the previous
interaction the only thing distinguishing them is their possession of an aperture or sun
avatar. During the interaction observed in the video the prior participants carried out a
Relational Ability Task. This task has individuals view the possible verbal pronunciation
of a word and try to match it with one of two symbols from an ancient language to that
pronunciation. In reality there are no right answers to the task, but participants are led to
believe there are.
Participants are informed that they will be carrying out the same task and will be
identified through possession of one of the same avatars they observe, the other of which
will be given to a partner. Participants are then asked a series of comprehension check
questions to ensure they understood the Relational Ability Task. In order to continue they
are required to correctly answer 4 out of the 5 comprehension check questions. Failure to
do so results in a message informing the participant that they are unable to continue
because they have not demonstrated that they adequately understand the task. Following
this, they view the video of the previous interaction and are asked to indicate which
avatar they would like to possess for the next part of the study if they were given a

1, 6 were dropped from condition 2, and 1 was dropped from condition 3. Equal cell sizes were desired to
run accurate ANOVA’s.
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choice. They then completed a series of ratings to obtain their perspective on how they
viewed the previous interactants and their avatars as status valued objects.
The second part of the study had participants carry out 5 practice rounds of the
Relational Ability task, followed by adaptations of the two previous Likert scales asking
them to rate their expected performance and the expected performance of their partner
during the Relational Ability Task. Before the practice rounds individuals were given
another set of directions and comprehension checks. Like the first set, passing 4 out of
the 5 questions was required to continue in the study.
The practice rounds differed from the rounds observed in the video in two ways.
First, a score was not kept. This was to make performance ambiguous, encouraging
inference from the knowledge individuals had about each other, which in this case was
only the difference in avatars possessed by the individual. Second, the partner that
participants were paired with was actually a simulated other which was preprogramed to
disagree with them on 4 out of the 5 practice rounds.
After the practice rounds participants filled out adaptations of the first two Likert
scales, along with the additional status and ability items that were asked during the first
part of the study. These adaptations asked participants to make assessments of
performance expectations for themselves and their partners as well as and the status value
of the objects that they possessed. Following these ratings participants were asked to
provide additional information about themselves. This information included
demographics, as well as suspicion checks and additional items to see if the participants
had seen the geometric patterns and shapes before. Around 26% reported that they had
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seen these avatars outside of the study, with the most common location of the avatars
being video games, specifically smart phone games and the computer game Portal.
Although this did not seem to have any effect on the interpretation or ranking of the
avatars outside of the experimental manipulation.
After demographics were collected, participants were debriefed and thanked for
their participation. The mTurk website handled all pay, recruitment, and work rejection
procedures, in addition to record keeping and communication between myself and the
participants if it was needed.
4.1 VARIABLES
Variables for this study included measures of general performance expectations
from a scale created by Zeller and Warnecke (1973), measures of status value from the
Status Value Scale (Thye 2000), and single Likert scale questions asking about perceived
ability at similar tasks, general ability, and individual status. In addition to these items
were single questions on how luck effected their perspectives of performance and how
feelings of control effect their perspectives of performance. For the first part of the study
these questions were asked to participants about observed individuals. For the second part
of the study participants were asked to answer the questions with relation to themselves
and their partner.
The Zeller and Warnecke scale was used to rate general expectations for
performance and competency. The scale itself is made up of nine Likert scale items that
are used to rate: expected performance (e.g., better at or able to perform a task),
intelligence, worth, industriousness, superiority, ability, and morality. All of these items

21

were done on a 1-7 scale. The scales alpha is .93. During analysis a simple factor loading
was performed on this scale to see if it contained different components. This was done
because the original literature proposed that there are three unique factors that items of
this scale load onto (Zeller and Warnecke 1973). Results of the factor analysis show that,
although multiple factor loadings can be found, none of the items reliably load onto
independent factors. Because of this the items of the Zeller and Warnecke scale are
treated as a single scale with no factor divisions in analysis. However, at times during
analysis, specific items of interest will be referred to individually.
The status value scale was created by Shane Thye and is used to rate the status
value that an object or characteristic possesses (Thye 2000). It is composed of three
Likert scale items measuring the value, meaningfulness, and honor of an object. Similar
to the general expectations scale, all items on this scale are rated from 1-7. The scales
reported alpha was .89. All scales and individual items were completed by the participant
and were carried out for all actors involved in an interaction. In other words, for the video
observation section of the study participants filled out the scales and items for the
observed others, but for the avatar possession and practice interaction part of the study
participants filled out the items and scales for themselves and their simulated partner. In
addition to these scales and the single item Likert scales, participants answered a series of
demographic questions that asked for their age, level of education, approximant income,
and subjective Social Economic Status.
Several comprehension checks were used during the study to ensure that
participants understood the directions given to them, the meaning of the avatars, and what
happened in prior interactions. The comprehension checks were divided into two sets of
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5, one set was taken after the first part of the study to make sure that participants
understood the meaning of the avatars to the study, the rules of interaction during the first
part of the study, and how scoring worked during the task. The second set was taken after
participants read directions about the practice rounds to make sure that participants
understood that they were interacting with a partner, what the procedure was for the
practice rounds, and that a score was not kept for the practice rounds.
Two manipulation checks were also included in the experiment. The first
manipulation check was a series of questions asking about the performance of observed
actors using the avatars as a form of identification. This check also includes a series of
questions on the value of the avatars and the participants preferred choice for an avatar in
the next part of the study if they were allowed to choose. Results of this manipulation
check show that individuals did interpret performance and value correctly, with over 70%
correctly identifying the avatar of the higher and lower preforming actor and viewed the
higher preforming actors’ avatar more valuable (see table 4.2). The majority of
individuals also chose the higher status avatar as the one they would want in the next
task, but the variance of responses is greater than what would be expected. However, it
seems that one of the reasons may have been that individuals found the eye avatar more
attractive in the mTurk population then in the student population used for the avatar
norming study.
The second manipulation check followed the final set of scales and asked
participants how much of their earnings for the study would they hypothetically be
willing to give to possess the avatar of their partner. Previous research on status value and
power has found that if an avatar has higher status value then it will have greater
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exchange value. In addition to this, individuals are willing to exchange monetary
resources for a high status valued object, such as a poker chip. I expect this to be true in
this experiment regardless of the lack of actual exchange. Results from comparisons
between conditions show that there were no significant differences between what
participants were willing to exchange for the simulated others avatar, with a sizable
number of individuals choosing not to propose a hypothetical amount regardless of the
condition that they were in. This may have been the result of individuals valuing their
own avatar more than expected, regardless of its high or low status. This explanation is
expanded on in the discussion.
Table 4.2 Manipulation Check Results
Frequency

Percentage

Correctly chose High

148

77.08

Correctly chose Low

136

70.83

Highest Value

132

68.75

Individual Choice

90

46.88
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
The sample of mTurk workers that participated in this study are similar to
samples reported by previous research using the same platform (Berinksy et al. 2012;
Huff and Tingley 2015). The sample itself is 64% male and a majority of participants
report their race as white. Most participants report some level of higher education, with
48% of participants holding a college degree, and another 27% having at least some
college education. The age of participants ranges from 19 to 70, with a mean of 34 and a
median of 32. Frequency tables of age, when compared to the median of age, show that
the upper limits seem to be driven by select outliers. Looking solely at frequency of
response, most participants were in their late 20s and early to mid 30s. In terms of
subjective SES and income, most participants made less than $60,000 a year, and
considered themselves in the middle of the subjective SES scale. More details are
provided in table 5.1.
Results from this study can be divided into before and after an avatar is possessed
by the participant. The analysis of before possession includes a series of t-tests comparing
the ratings of the high and low status valued avatars and the general performance
expectations and status of the individuals possessing these objects. Results for after the
avatar is possessed are mostly composed of a series of One-Way ANOVA’s with
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Table 5.1 Demographic Summary Statistics
Variables

Count Percentage

Race
White

135

70.31%

Black

27

14.06%

Hispanic

9

4.69%

Asian or Pacific Islander

9

4.69%

Native American

9

4.69%

Other

3

1.56%

Male

123

64.06%

Female

68

35.42%

Other

1

0.52%

High School

28

14.66%

Some College

52

27.23%

College Graduate

92

48.17%

Sex

Education

Graduate School or Higher 19

26

9.95%

Bonferroni post hoc tests, and a series of regressions models using participants selfreported demographics as predictors. The One-way ANOVA’s test for differences
between conditions are followed up by Bonferroni post hoc tests if an ANOVA that had
significant results.
Table 5.2 T-test of Status Conferment – General Expectations Scale
Obs

Mean

Std.

Std. Deviation

Error

95% Confidence
Interval

Lo_Expect 192

37.56

.699

9.69

36.18

38.94

Hi_Expect

46.49

.601

8.33

45.30

47.68

-8.93

.922

-10.75

-7.12

Ha: diff < 0

Ha: diff !=0

Ha: diff > 0

Pr (T < t ) =

Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.000

Pr (T > t ) = 1.000

192

Difference

0.000
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Figure 5.1 Means of General Expectations Scale
Results of the t-tests show that there are significant differences between the means
of the general expectations scales for the referential actors (P < 0.001, d =0.989).
However, there are no differences for the Status Value scale and the individual Likert
items of status, ability, and ability at a similar task. Although all of the individual items in
the general expectations scale are significant, several are worth taking note of
individually. Specifically, scale items measuring how much better and able an individual
is generally expected to be compared to their partner (see description in variables section)
are of interest. This is because they relate more to the manipulation of specific
expectations than other items on the scale, providing insight into an individual’s
perception of performance and specific expectations for the observed task. Both of these
items were significant at P < 0.001 with an effect size of d = -1.00 for better and d = .785
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for able. See table 5.2 for a summary table of the t-test and figure 5.1 for a visualization
of the differences between avatars.
Table 5.3 One-way ANOVA of General Performance Expectations (Self-Rating of
Participant)
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Prob > F

Between

231.72

3

77.24

0.96

0.4115

15085.02

188

80.24

15316.75

191

80.19

Groups
Within
Groups
Total

Table 5.4 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for General Performance Expectations (Self-Rating
of Participant)
Condition 1
Condition 2

Condition 2

Condition 3

-0.271
1.000

Condition 3

Condition 4

0.625

.895

0.320

1.00

2.54

2.81

1.92

0.997

0.754

1.000
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Table 5.5 One-way ANOVA of General Performance Expectations (Participant
ratings of Partner)
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Prob > F

Between

228.97

3

76.32

0.92

0.443

Groups
Within Groups

15630.23 188

83.14

Total

15859.20 191

83.032

Table 5.6 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for General Performance Expectations (Participant
ratings of Partner)
Condition 1
Condition 2

Condition 2

Condition 3

.625
1.000

Condition 3

Condition 4

-2.270

-2.89

1.000

0.729

-0.958

-1.583

1.31

1.000

1.000

1.000

One-way ANOVA’s with Bonferroni post-hoc tests primarily composed the
analysis of events after the participants possess one of the avatars. These tests compared
partner’s self-ratings and ratings of their partner on expected performance, status, and
status value. Self-ratings and partner ratings are analyzed independent of each other, with
the comparisons focused on differences between conditions. For the general expectations
scale, there was no difference in either participants’ self-rating and ratings of their
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partner’s general expectations. In other words, participants did not rate themselves, nor
their partners general performance expectations in significantly different ways between
conditions (see tables 5.3 – 5.6).
Table 5.7 One-way ANOVAs of the Status Value Scale (Self-Rating of Participant)
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Prob > F

Between

216.43

3

72.14

3.54

0.015

Within Groups

3830.94

188

20.37

Total

4047.37

191

21.19

Groups

Table 5.8 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for Status Value Scale (Self-Rating of Participant)
Condition 1
Condition 2

Condition 2

Condition 3

-1.104
1.000

Condition 3

Condition 4

1.79

2.89

0.320

0.012

.792

1.89

-1

1.000

0.246

1.000

However, the Status Value scale did show statistically significant differences
between conditions, specifically when referencing the value of the avatar in possession of
the participant. When the participant is in possession of the high status avatar, the one
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previously possessed by a high performing actor, they rate it as having higher status
value. There are no significant differences found between conditions for the participants
rating of their partners avatar. This finding is only true for comparisons between
conditions 2 and 3, in which the status values of the avatars are mismatched. Between
these conditions, the difference between Status Value scale ratings of the avatar is over a
point on the Likert scale, and is highly significant (P<.01, d = 2.42) 3. Table 5.7 and 5.8
provide a summary of this comparison. If items from the Status Value Scale are
considered individually, they are still found to be significant, with a Bonferroni post-hoc
test confirming that this significance is again only between the status mismatched
conditions. The results of this test are not reported but are available by request.
Table 5.9 One-way ANOVA results for Status (Participant ratings of Partner)
Source

SS

df

MS

F

Prob > F

Between

18.27

3

6.09

2.98

0.0325

Within Groups

383.708

188

2.04

Total

401.979

191

2.105

Groups

Similar to the Status Value scale, the Likert scale items for rating status and
ability at a similar task were significantly different when compared between conditions.
A Bonferroni post-hoc test indicates significance differences are again found between the
two status mismatched conditions, condition 2 and 3. However, the significance indicated
by the post-hoc tests is only observed for the ratings of the partner. Participants rated only
3

All significance levels and P-values are calculated using the unstandardized values.
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their partner as higher status when in possession of the higher status avatar (P < 0.10),
and as having greater ability at similar tasks (P < 0.01). For the participant themselves,
there was no effect on how they self-rating in terms of status and ability at a similar task.
Participants viewed their partner as having status and ability at a similar task when in
possession of the high status avatar; but the same is not true when the participant is in
possession of the high status avatar (see tables 5.9-5.12). Other items, such as participant
and partner ratings of ability, were not significantly difference between conditions.
Addition measures for perceived luck and control during the task were also insignificant.
However, the item measuring perceived control had notable differences between the
means of conditions 2 and 3. This difference was 0.64, but the means for these conditions
contained a large amount of variance.
Table 5.10 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for Status Likert Item
Condition 1
Condition 2

Condition 2

Condition 3

.6041
.238

Condition 3

Condition 4

-.125

-.729

1.000

0.080

.479

-.125

.604

0.612

1.000

.238

4

Noticing this difference led me to think that the effect could be present, but I did not have enough power
to find it. Because of this I did a post-hoc power analysis to find how many participants would be needed to
obtain significance if the effect is actually present. The results of this analysis showed that I would need to
run an additional 450 participants in order to gain significance if the effect is actually present.
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Figure 5.2 Single Likert Items by Condition
Table 5.11 One-way ANOVA results for Similar Ability (Participant ratings of
Partner)
Source
SS
df
MS
F
Prob > F
Between

23.35

3

7.78

351.48

188

1.87

374.82

191

1.96

Groups
Within
Groups
Total

34

4.16

0.007

Table 5.12 Bonferroni Post-Hoc for Similar Ability Likert Item
Condition 1
Condition 2

Condition 2

Condition 3

.208
1.000

Condition 3

Condition 4

-.729

-.9374

.058

0.006

-.125

-.3333

.604

1.000

1.000

0.190

Although not part of the theory, exploratory analysis using a series of regressions
was run on the demographics data provided by participants to test of effects of participant
background and susceptibility to status processes involved in possession of an object.
Regressions on the general expectations scales, Status Value scale, and individual Likert
items used the demographics of sex, age, income, and education as independent variables.
Results from the regressions for participant and partner status value and general
expectations show education as a significant predictor, increasing general expectations or
Status Value of an object when it is present. However, no other demographic variables
are significant in the regression models (see table 5.13).
Running a reduced model with only education as an independent variable yields
significant coefficients of .89 for self-reported status value, 1.17 for partner’s status
value, and 2.38 for partners general expectations. This generally confirms the observation
above: that as education increases, individuals see avatars as more valuable (see table
5.14). However, it is not possible to rule out alternative explanations for this effect, such
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as individuals with a higher education reading and following study directions more
closely than other participants.
For participants’ ratings of themselves, status is the only item to have any
significant predictors. A single predictor, education, is reported as significant, with a
coefficient of .25. For the participants ratings of the partner, status, ability, and ability at a
similar task have significant predictors. Status and ability share the significant predictor
of education, with a coefficient of .365 and .413. Ability at a similar task has two
significant predictors, education and income. In this model the effect of education is
significant and positive, with a coefficient of 0.424, and the effect of income is
significant and negative, with a coefficient of -0.179. Reduced models were run for all of
these variables. The results show these variables, with the exception of self-ratings of
status, stay significant. However, there is a notable drop in significance of the coefficients
and the r-squared for most of the reduced models. This drop is most notable for ratings of
Status for self and partner (see table 5.13 and 5.14). Although not directly relevant to the
theory, this exploratory analysis provides insight into future research, particularly for
understanding how the background of individuals interacts with the process of
expectation allocation when high status objects are involved.
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Table 5.13 Regression tables for scales and Single Likert Items (full models)
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General
Expectations
– Self

General
Expectations –
Partner

Status
Value –
Self

Status
Value –
Partner

Status Self

Status –
Partner

Ability –
Self

Ability –
Partner

Similar
Ability –
Self

Similar
Ability
–
Partner

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model
10

Social –
Economic
Scale

.411 (.33)

-.151 (.330)

-.252
(.169)

-.137
(.171)

-.04
(.059)

-.020
(.053)

.045
(.053)

-.066
(.049)

.104
(.055)

-.046
(.050)

Sex

-.789 (1.33)

-.613 (1.32)

.104 (.678)

-.875
(.687)

-.177
(.234)

-.086
(.212)

-.129
(.214)

-.096
(.197)

-.043
(.221)

-.049
(.201)

Age

-.022 (.067)

.016 (.067)

-.005
(.034)

.014
(.035)

-.017
(.012)

-.009
(.011)

-.003
(.011)

.001
(.010)

.0005
(.011)

.011
(.010)

Education

.95 (.781)

2.72 (.778)***

1.016
(.400)*

1.25
(.404) **

.25
(.14)*

.365
.019
(.125)** (.126)

.413
(.116)
***

.013
(.130)

.432
(.118)
***

Income

.074(.419)

-.484 (.419)

-.009
(.214)

-.013
(.217)

.034
(.075)

-.108
(.067)

-.029
(.068)

-.104
(.062)

-.051
(.07)

-.167
(.066)
**

Intercept

39.20

32.98

10.12

9.44

4.60

4.07

4.66

3.74

4.32

3.35

R—squared

.026

.064

.042

.059

.033

.056

.007

.080

.020

.098

Table 5.14 Regression tables for scales and Single Likert Items (reduced models)
General
Status
Status
Status - Status – Ability
Similar
Expectations – Value
Value – Self
Partner
–
Ability
Partner
– Self
Partner
Partner
–
Partner
Model
3

Model 4

Model
5

Model 6

Model 8

Model
10

Education

2.38 (.74) **

.891
(.380)
*

1.17
(.385)
**

.231
(.133)

.285
(.120)*

.321
(.112)
**

.424
(.118)
***

Income

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.179
(.058)
**

Intercept

31.64

9.37

8.37

3.77

3.47

3.33

3.32

R—
squared

.052

.020

.047

.016

.029

.04

.086
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Model 2

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
In general, I had expected status value to transfer from an individual to an object,
and then temporarily back to the individual via possession. From this I expected the
temporarily held status to also increase the general expectations that the individual holds
for themselves or another in possession of the high status valued object. Instead,
participants attribute greater performance expectations to the initial individual in
possession of the object, but they do not seem to immediately gain status value as
indicated from the status value scale. However, when considering the manipulation
checks, participants do correctly indicate the status of the high value object and typically
prefer it to the low value object. Looking past this, when the avatars are possessed by
participants and their simulated partner we do find large differences in status value, with
the individual valuing the high status valued object more when they are in possession of
it. Taking both of these observations together I claim support for the first hypothesis:
status value is able to transfer from the status of the individuals in the initial interaction to
the object. However, I would note caution with my support for this hypothesis because
the increase or decrease in status value does not seem to be successfully conferred to the
object until it is possessed by others in a new interaction.
The second hypothesis, that possession of a high status valued object will increase
an individual’s status during interactions is found to be partially supported. It seems that
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the reference of who possesses the object in question matters more than previously
expected. Findings suggest that status only increases when another is in possession of the
high status valued object. This is the opposite for Status Value, which does not see an
increase when others are in possession the high status valued object. However, it sees a
large increase when the individual providing evaluations of the situation is in possession
of the high status valued object. Again, this only has a significant effect when objects of
two different status values are involved. This may hint at a cognitive effect on how
performance is allocated, where when in possession of a high status valued object the
performance is attributed to the object instead of the individuals.
The third hypothesis, that possession of a high status valued object will increase
an individual’s performance expectations, is also partly supported. In general, the trend
for this hypothesis is the same as hypothesis two, when another possesses the status
valued object they get a boost in their performance expectations. However, this only
holds true for specific expectations measured by the ability at a similar task item, not for
expectations measured by the general expectations scale.
The most puzzling finding from this study is that individuals see the object as
possessing greater status value when they are in possession of it, but do not see
themselves as possessing greater status or ability when in possession. It could be that the
object is not transferring expectations from the initial interaction to the individual and
thus doesn’t confer status to them during possession. However, when the simulated
partner is in possession of the High Status Valued object, they are assumed to have higher
status and perform better at a similar task, but the status value of their object is not seen
as greater in comparison.
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One explanation for this is that there is a difference in the process of allocation of
value to the object, and status and performance expectations to the individual. When the
individual possesses the high status value object they assume that it is the object instead
of their innate ability that is causing their performance. This results in them lowering
their expectations for themselves when not considering the object. For example, if an
individual expects to perform better with a specific brand of musical instrument,
regardless of the actual quality of the instrument, they may attribute positive performance
expectations to the object instead of themselves.
There is support for these differences in value resulting from possession from the
literature on the endowment effect, which states that individuals value an object more
than those without it simply because they are in possession of it (Kahnemen et al. 1991;
Morewedge and Giblin 2015). Experiments in economics literature look closer at this
concept, finding that once an object is given to an individual to possess, they attribute an
exchange value to it, often which is above the market price of the object (Kahnemen et al.
1991). This prevents individuals from parting with their endowed object because they
value it more than what others are willing to exchange for it. However, when asked to
rate the attractiveness of an object in their possession it’s not see as more attractive than
its counterpart (Kahnemen et al. 1991). In addition to this interpretation of the
Endowment Effect, others have proposed that that the effect is actually the result of
evolutional advantages in situation interpretations (Huck et al. 2005), strategic
misinterpretation as a bargaining strategy (Kurt and Inman 2013), and bias in processing
exchange information (Ashby et al. 2012).
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The endowment effect explains in part why Status Value is not affected when
another is in possession of the status valued object. Because the experiment was designed
so that both the participant and their simulated partner possessed an object, a kind of floor
effect may have been created for the objects value. This could prevent the effects of
negative status value and expectations associated with the object from being perceived by
the individual. Future studies in this line of research should try to account for this effect
by including conditions in which no object is provided to one of the interactants, either
simulated or otherwise, with the single object being either high or low in status value.
Although this would change the scope of the theory this study tests, as the study proposes
to keep objects present for all individuals during their interactions as to keep things
similar. However, the change in the scope would allow for a measurement of how much
the endowment effect influences individuals valuation of an object.
This would also provide the study with more mundane realism because high status
objects are not always met with a viable lower status alterative. For example, an
individual possessing a Rolex watch is unlikely to have an interaction with another who
possess a lower value Rolex, or in many cases, a watch in general. Instead, the Rolex is
serving as a status valued object with no alternative. Strengthening the claim to a Rolex
Watch as a status valued object, those with a Rolex may still refer to their smart phone as
a timekeeper, making the Rolex a part of their outfit instead of an object with utility.
It is also possible that there is a mismatch between what I measured using the
general expectations scale and the manipulation. During the observation of previous
individuals interacting with the avatars a very specific set of characteristics was
manipulated, ability at a Relational Ability task. However, items that make up the general
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expectations scale created by Zeller and Warnecke do not include measurements of
specific expectations, such as ability at a specific variety of task (i.e., writing, pattern
recognition, woodworking, etc.). Because of this, the scale could be missing the
expectations being manipulated in the interaction simply by not measuring them.
This claim has some support from results of the items used to measure ability,
ability at a similar task, and status. Results from between groups comparisons show that
participants indicated that when their simulated partner possessed the status valued object
they were seen as having greater ability at a similar task and higher status in comparison
to the participant. Participants did not get the same boost when it in possession of a high
status object. However, they were not asked directly about expectations related to specific
ability in a scale or series of questions. Instead, we are inferring their specific
expectations from the single Likert scale item. Other aspects of specific performance
expectations, such as regular or future performance, and the utility of the item during
performance, were not accounted for.
Another explanation for the lack of general expectations transferring is that there
is not enough status valued added to the object from the one interaction being salient to
the participant. Because the avatar did not have a long history of possession, it is possible
that status value had not been adequately conferred to the object because it was not clear
that the avatar is actually tied to performance. For example, a Stradivarius Violin was not
inherently given high Status Value from its creation, but it has high Status Value because
of its association with the Stradivarius family and with other musicians that possessed a
Stradivarius and performed well. In addition to this, in previous work on Status Value
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and power in exchange relationships there were multiple rounds of exchange that
solidified Status Value of the object via attachment to the individual.
Future studies are needed to understand this effect and the incrementation that a
single interaction causes in terms of Status Value versus when multiple interactions are
known and salient to the individual. For example, future studies could use the same
situation, and instead of providing the participant with the object after a single
interaction, the participant could view a diagram of individual interaction in a specific
order. This diagram could present the interaction sequence and the performance outcomes
of the interaction, providing participants with a clear understanding of how far away they
are from the initial interaction, and an understanding of the performance history of those
in possession of the object. This could also be done as a simple vignette experiment
providing the same information to the participant as written text, although the
manipulation would not be as strong as a visual diagram.
It may also be possible that status value can increase and decrease over time
depending on the history of possession. For example, if a brand of cookware is given
high status value via its association with important culinary figures but is then shown to
be common along a line of very poorly preforming fry cooks it is likely that this will
lower its value in the eyes of individuals that are aware of its common possession among
fry cooks. The change in status value via association with high or low status others may
be a summarizing effect, a sequential effect, or have a curvilinear effect in which once a
certain amount of status value is reached it is impossible to lose value regardless of the
individual associated with it. Although there is not much existing research on how this
mechanism may work, it does fit with existing research on the transfer of performance
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expectations between situations in experiments (Markovsky et al. 1984) and classrooms
(Cohen and Lotan 1995).
Lastly, the relevance of the object to the task could matter more than what was
previously expected. For example, if the task which an individual performs is an Algebra
task and the high status avatar is an Abacus, it would be more salient because of the task
and more important to the individual when they or another possess it. In Thye’s studies
on status value and exchange value poker chips are used, which already have an
exchange value salience to them either from gambling or from use in a number of board
games, and the effects of these studies are stronger and clearer than I find here.
However, there are similar studies that do not use task meaningful objects and are
still able to gain significant results. Harkness (2017) studied status spread via association
with reward states as the object of status value, which is more abstract then the
possession of an avatar. This study also utilized task ratings of specific ability for the
partner that were affected by reward level assignment, which provides support for even
more abstract objects. But it is possible that using the avatar as the status valued object,
because of its abstractness and lack of connection to the task, resulted in a lesser effect on
all measures then what would have been observed if an object had clearer relevance.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
At the turn of the 20th century, Veblen proposed that individuals will imitate those
of higher social classes in order to raise their status (Veblen 1899). In a separate line of
theory, Frank (1985) proposed that individuals are willing to exchange time and
resources for association with high status others and groups. Tying these together, Thye
(2000) proposed and experimentally confirmed the Status Value Theory of Power, which
claimed that individuals of higher status think of their resources as more valuable and are
able to exchange their resources for more of a low status other’s resource. However, in all
of these lines of inquiry the question of whether the possession of a status valued object
actually increases status was not directly answered. This study makes important first
steps in answering this question by expanding existing theory and discussing the nature
of status value outside the standard context of Status Characteristics.
This study is only able to partly support the proposed extension of the Theory of
Status Value, finding that status value and expectations only clearly transfer to the other,
not the self. The results suggest that when individuals are in possession of an object of
high status value they attribute positive performance to the object instead of themselves,
increasing its status value. However, when another is in possession of a Status Valued
Object both status and expectations are attributed to the other. Additional status value is
not attributed to the object in their possession. This paradoxical outcome needs additional
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research to be clearly understood. However, several explanations have been put forward
to explain these findings. The first proposes that there is an unaccounted for process of
expectation formation in which individuals perform a kind of cognitive dissonance in
order to explain why they do not possess a status valued object. A second explanation
proposes that the endowment effect resulted in a floor value for any object that an
individual possesses. Finally, a third explanation proposes that more than a single
interaction is needed before status value can clearly be tied to an object. After a series of
interactions, a threshold effect may take hold, allowing the item to contain status value
high enough to be transferred to another individual clearly. In addition, a high enough
status valuation may also adequately confer status to another via a similar process.
This study is not without its problems and oversights, specifically in
measurement. During the study specific performance expectations were manipulated.
However, the scale used to gain information about status expectations was a general
expectations scale. This mismatch in manipulation and measurement is likely to have
resulted in lost information on how individuals actually felt and develop evaluations.
Taking this into account, the measure that did get at specific expectations, performance at
a similar task, was significant and fits into explanations 1 and 2 proposed in this
discussion.
Although there are several scales for measuring general expectations, including
Zeller and Wernecke’s general expectations scale (Zeller and Wernecke 1973) and
Ridgeway’s Status and Conscientiousness scale (Ridgeway and Correll 2006), there is not
an existing scale for measuring specific expectations. Such a scale should be developed
and incorporated into future studies on status value and object possession in order to
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adequately measure expectations and further our understanding of how status and
expectations spread to individuals in possession of Status Valued Objects.
Overall, this study does provide some answers to the question of “do status valued
objects spread status.” However, the answers provided are less clear than what was
hoped, leaving room for future research. Specifically, additional research is needed to
address which explanation is more likely to explain this study’s observations, and new
expectations scales are needed in order to clearly get at specific instead of general
expectations.
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APPENDIX A: FORMAL THEORY MODULE
Terms and Notation Key
Status (sx): Perceived prestige or honor
Value: The importance socially assigned to an object
Object (Rx): an item that can be possessed
Status Value (vx): type of importance, prestige, or honor attached to an individual
characteristic or exchangeable resource
Actor (P, O, J, Q): an individual who participates in an interaction
Performance Expectations (ex): an actors expected ability at a task

Scope Conditions
This theory extension will apply under conditions in which (1) at least two
noticeably different objects are present, (2) actors are differentiated only by the status
values of the objects they possess, (3) there is a clear and salient difference in ability of
actors during the first interaction.

Propositions
The propositions in this theory expansion are divided between two modules. The
first module explains the interactions of two sets of individuals and their interaction with
a nominally valued object. The first set of individuals, P & O, are actors in in possession
of the nominally valued objects. The second set of individuals, J & Q, are observing this
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interaction. During the second module J and Q are given possession of the status valued
objects.

Module 1
Proposition 1: From the perspectives of J and Q, if the performance expectations of P are
greater than the performance expectations of O, then the status of P will be greater than
the status of O.
Actors observing the interaction and noticing the difference in performance on the
observed task adopt the belief that the status P is greater than the status of O. This is
derived from assumption 5 of SCT (Berger et all. 1977).

From the perspectives of J and Q !" $% > $' , )ℎ$+ ,% > ,'

Proposition 2: If J and Q observe an interaction between P and O where the performance
expectations for P are greater than performance expectations for O, then the value placed
on objects in P's possession will be greater than the value placed on objects in O’s
possession.
This is derived from assumption 1 of SCT (Berger et al. 1977), the status transfer
process described in Status Value Theory (Berger and Fisek 2006, 2013), and the
observation process that is possible with doubly dissimilar encounters (Ridgeway 1991).

-" . /+0 1 23,$45$ ,% > ,' , )ℎ$+ 567 (9% ) > 567 (9' )
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Module 2
Proposition 3: If J possesses object NP, and Q possesses object NO, then J and Q will
assume that these objects indicate status and infer status from these objects. This is
derived from proposition 2 of the proposed theory and the reverse process of Reward
Expectations Theory (Berger et al. 19851).
This proposition requires that objects possessed by J and Q are the same objects
that were in the interactions taking place during proposition 1 and 2. This requirement
bridges the two modules via a shared reference for status.

-" . ;2,,$,,$, 9< /+0 1 ;2,,$,,$, 9= , )ℎ$+ . /+0 1 /,,>?$ ,6 > ,7

Proposition 4: If the status value of object NP is greater than the status value of object NO,
and there are no contrary sources of information, then the status value of the object
possessed by actor P and actor O will be used to form performance expectations. This is
derived from proposition 3 of the proposed theory and assumptions 2 and 5 of SCT
(Berger et al. 1977).

-" ,6 > ,7 , )ℎ$+ $6 > $7

Derivations
Derivation 1: If the status value of object Np is greater than the status value of No, then J
and Q will see P as having greater status then O. This follows from propositions 1 and 2
from module 1 and assumptions 2 and 5 from SCT (Berger et al. 1977).
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Derivation 2: If the performance expectations of P over O is greater than 0, then the
performance expectations of J over Q is also greater than 0. This follows from
assumptions 1 and 4, showing that the performance expectations based off the initial
interaction carry over to future interaction with new actors possessing the same status
valued object.

-" $<= > 0, )ℎ$+ $67 > 0
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APPENDIX B: GRAPH THEORETIC MODEL
The figures below illustrate the theory using the graph theoretic model5. I have organized
the diagrams and explanations into the initial interaction that status value is created
(figure 3) and the interactions by observers of the initial interaction (figure 4).

Figure B.1 – Initial Interaction
In the initial interaction 4 actors are present (J,P,O,Q). In figure 3 these actors
occupy positions of interactors (P,O) and observers (J,Q). The interactants are tied to
different nominal objects (R+,-) through a possession bond. The objects connect to task

5

The graph theoretic model comes from the book Status Characteristics and Social Interaction (Berger et
al. 1977) and articles on the Status Value Theory of Power (Thye 2000; Thye and Harrell 2016). I have
added the observing actors into a graph model based off these two sources. The second model for
possession of objects by actors who were initially observing the interaction was also based off these
sources, but more liberties were taking in adapting the model to the theory in this thesis.
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specific status characteristic (C), which is expected to be instrumental to the task. In the
case of the initial condition, this is the observed performance between actor’s P and O.
The specific status characteristic (C) is connected to the task outcome (T) via the
generalized expectation state (t) and the abstract task ability (Y). In other words, the
observed ability or a specific characteristic is assumed relevant to a task. It is used to
reference generalized expectations of those interacting and indicate if they would have
abilities instrumental to the task. This results in paths of length 5 and 6.
Over the course of repetitive interaction, the observed performance of P and O
would cause actors only observing the interaction to infer a connection between the
individual’s ability and their status in the dyad. Status is then conferred onto the object in
the interactants possession, giving it status value. This inferred connection is shown in
figure 3 via the dashed lines. The described process is expected to show similarities to
Thye and colleagues work on Status Value Theory of Power (Thye 2000, Thye and
Harrell 2016).
After the initial interaction creates salient differences in the valuation of objects
possessed by P and O, they drop out of the interaction and the objects are assigned to the
observing actors J and Q, creating a possession bond. This changes the graph model by
removing the specific status characteristic that was present and the dimensionality bond
that connected the two actors. The dimensionality bond is instead shifted down to the
generalized expectations state (t), meaning that differences between the two actors are
based on the generalized expectations they have instead of a specific or diffused
characteristic. Because there is no characteristic present except for the objects bestowed
to actors, the status value of these objects will be used to create performance
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expectations. This adjusted graph model can be seen in figure 4. This results in paths of
length 4 and 5. The tie between the objects and the characteristics of the actors is shown
with a dashed line.

Figure B.2 – Observers Interaction
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APPENDIX C: COUNTERBALANCING AVATARS
Counterbalancing of the avatars was done by random assignment in Qualtrics.
Participants had an equal chance of being assigned version 1 or version 2 of the video.
The versions were the same in scoring by the referential actors at the meaning insight
task and in the text and manipulations displayed. The only difference was that version 1
had the sun avatar as the high status avatar, and version 2 had the aperture avatar as the
high status avatar, an effect which was created by flipping the avatars in the video. In
other words, the visual effects that highlighted scoring and the scores remained constant,
only the avatars were moved between versions to create the counterbalance effect.
There is no difference found when using t-tests to compare the means of the
general expectations scale between video version. This illustrates that counterbalancing
did not have an effect on the general expectations participants had for the individual in
possession of the high and low status avatars. However, there is a significant effect when
comparing means of the Status Value Scale, as shown in table C.1 and C.2. It seems that
in the second version of the video participants rated both the high and low status avatar
higher during interaction. When comparing the mean of the low value and high value
avatar within conditions there is no effect (see tables C.3 and C.4). This leads to the
conclusion that, although there is an effect between videos on how highly avatars were
rated, there is not video specific effects that would have influenced the results.
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Table C.1 Video Version Comparison, between videos – Low Status Avatar
Std.

Mean

Version 1

96

11.74

.464

4.54

10.82

12.66

Version 2

96

15.64

.304

2.98

15.03

16.24

-3.90

.555

-4.99

-2.801

Difference

Error

Ha: diff < 0
Pr (T < t ) =
0.000

Std. Deviation

95% Confidence

Obs

Interval

Ha: diff !=0

Ha: diff > 0

Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.000

Pr (T > t ) = 1.000

Table C.2 Video Version Comparison, between videos – High Status Avatar
Std.

Mean

Lo_Value

96

12.19

.434

4.54

11.33

13.05

Hi_Value

96

15.19

.369

3.58

14.46

15.91

-.448

.635

-4.12

-1.88

Difference

Ha: diff < 0
Pr (T < t ) =
0.000

Std. Deviation

95% Confidence

Obs

Error

Interval

Ha: diff !=0

Ha: diff > 0

Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.000

Pr (T > t ) = 1.000
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Table C.3 Video Version Comparison, Version 1
Std.

Mean

Lo_Value

96

11.74

.463

4.54

10.82

12.66

Hi_Value

96

12.18

.434

4.25

11.34

13.05

-.448

.635

-1.700

.805

Difference

Error

Ha: diff < 0
Pr (T < t ) =
0.2407

Std. Deviation

95% Confidence

Obs

Interval

Ha: diff !=0

Ha: diff > 0

Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.481

Pr (T > t ) = 0.759

Table C.4 Video Version Comparison, Version 2
Std.

Mean

Lo_Value

96

15.64

.304

2.98

15.03

16.24

Hi_Value

96

15.19

.366

3.54

14.46

15.91

-.448

.476

-.49

1.39

Difference

Ha: diff < 0
Pr (T < t ) =
0.826

Std. Deviation

95% Confidence

Obs

Error

Interval

Ha: diff !=0

Ha: diff > 0

Pr (|T| < |t|) = 0.348

Pr (T > t ) = 0.174
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APPENDIX D: AVATAR NORMING STUDY
University of South Carolina students rated the attractiveness of a selection of
avatars in return for extra credit in select courses. A total of 20 participants were recruited
for the norming study. The age of participants was 19-26, with most being 19. A majority
of the participants were female. The most common major was nursing, with 5 participants
claiming it as their major.
The avatars were found at the website ICONSDB.com
(https://www.iconsdb.com/). A total of 20 avatars were selected from the website. Each
participant rated each avatar in terms of their interestingness, value, visual attractiveness,
and how much that individual would like to be represented by the avatar. All ratings were
done using a 1 to 5 point Likert scale in which participants claimed agreement or
disagreement with a statement saying that the avatar was one of the Likert statements.
The results from the study, some summary statistics, and discussion on avatar selection is
below.
General mean comparisons and a one-way ANOVA were carried out to test the
attractiveness and similarity of the avatars. The ANOVA results are not reported because
meaningful interpretation of the ANOVAs was difficult due to small sample sizes and
large standard deviations. Because of this only the means were considered when selecting
the avatars.

63

In the end, the items measuring how interesting and visibly pleasing avatars were
used as the metric to decide which avatars to include. The logic behind this was that both
interesting and attractive avatars would keep participants attention during the study.
Avatars with the highest and most similar means were selected with the assumption that
these would be similar enough in attractiveness during day to day interaction as not to
draw undue attention or preference from participants. In the end, the Aperture, Eye,
Light, and Sun avatars were chosen.
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Table D.1 Means and Standard Errors of Avatar
Interesting

Valuable

Pleasing

Represent

2 x 2 cube

2.8 (.26)

2.8 (.22)

3.1 (.24)

2.6 (.23)

3 x 3 cube

3 (.30)

2.8 (.26)

3.4 (.18)

2.25 (.22)

Aperture

3.9 (.14)

2.85 (.23)

4.3 (.16)

2.9 (.22)

Basket

3.05 (.26)

3.2 (.24)

2.9 (.25)

2.35 (.21)

Beaker

3.25 (.20)

3.6 (.18)

3.25 (.18)

2.8 (.23)

Bolt

3.6 (.21)

3.55 (.20)

3.4 (.20)

3.3 (.26)

Bug

3.5 (.24)

2.9 (.20)

3.35 (.21)

2.4 (.26)

Compass

3.45 (.23)

3.5 (.20)

3.25 (.18)

2.65 (.21)

Crescent

3.3 (.27)

3.3 (.22)

3.8 (.17)

3.3 (.21)

Eye

3.75 (.19)

3.6 (.18)

3.3 (.23)

2.65 (.24)

Flag

2.8 (.21)

2.95 (.18)

2.75 (.22)

2.65 (.23)

Flame

3.45 (.22)

3.15 (.20)

3.25 (.20)

3 (.21)

HF Circle

2.7 (.23)

2.8 (.22)

3.2 (.20)

2.55 (.26)

Light

3.9 (.18)

3.2 (.21)

3.5 (.18)

3.15 (.21)

Planet

3.75 (.22)

3.65 (.20)

3.55 (.26)

3.5 (.20)

Puzzle

3.35 (.21)

3.35 (.18)

3.45 (.20)

3.7 (22)

Signpost

3.15 (.21)

3.15 (.17)

2.75 (.16)

2.35 (.15)

Star

3.2 (.28)

3.5 (.24)

3.75 (.22)

3.35 (.25)

Sun

3.95 (.18)

3.05 (.18)

4.1 (.19)

3.85 (.21)
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